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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RELIABLE FURNITURE COMPANY, 
A Utah Corporation, 
vs. 
Appellant, 
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, WESTEiRN GENERAL 
AGENCY, a corporation, GENERAL 
ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, a corporation, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
NAT·URE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for special, general, and punitive 
damages and other relief, in which plaintiff claims de-
fendants conspired to compel plaintiff to accept a 
lesser amount than was rightfully due under a claim 
covered by a "business interruption" fire isurance policy, 
issued to plaintiff by defendant American Home Assur-
ance Company, herein called American Home. 
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DISPO·SITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted a motion of dismissal 
against plaintiff and in favor ~f defendants at pre-trial 
hearing, Plaintiff seeks a -reversal. 
STATEMENT OF POINT·S 
POINT 1. As a matter of law, the trial court erred 
in ruling that a tender of $12,609.39 was necessary he-
fore proceeding to trial. 
POINT 2. As a matter of law, the trial court erred 
in ruling that money was not property and so to with-
hold · p·ayment of$84,923.89, admittedly due plaintiff, 
was not economic duress and therefore was not action-
able. 
POINT 3. As a matter of law, the trial court erred 
in accepting carte blanche defendants counsel's state-
ment that there was no evidence of economic fraud or 
duress even though plaintiffs counsel stated they had 
such evidence to pToduce at the trial. 
POINT 4 .. The trial court erred in ruling that if 
$84,923.89 is available for loan purposes anywhere there 
could be no economic duress on Plaintiff, because the 
mere fact he cannot get that money due to his credit and 
financial condition is no sound reason for not obtaining 
this loan. 
POINT 5. The question of the alleged conspiracy 
among the defendants or their authorized agents as it 
relates to the issue of economic duress was one of fact 
that should have been submitted to a jury, and the 
trial court erred in granting the motion of the defend-
ants for a dismissal of the complaint and alleged cause 
of action. 
2 
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POINT 6. The trial court erred in failing to submit 
to a jury the issue of the scope of authority of Jack 
R. Day in acting for defendant, and in granting motion 
for dismissal for the defendants. 
POINT 7. The trial court erred in granting defend-
ant's motion to dismiss in that the facts before the 
court presented triable issues, and therefore, contrary 
to the laws of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF F ACT:S 
On May 12, 1959, American Home issued its stand-
ard form fire insurance policy vvith "Business Inter-
ruption Form No. 3," insuring plaintiff against loss 
directly resulting from necessary interruption of busi-
ness caused by damage or destruction of insured pre-
ises by fire (R. 1, 9, 29; Answer to Request for Admis-
sion of Facts No. 6). 
On January 1, 19·61, Fidelity and Guaranty Insur-
ance Underwriters, Inc. no longer a defendant herein, 
issued its policy, insuring plaintiff against loss and 
damage to stock, furniture and fixtures, resulting from 
fire (R. 1, 20). 
On March 30, 1961, a fire occurred at plaintiff's store 
in Ogden, Utah causing destruction and damage to 
stock, furniture and other property. 
During May, 1961, plaintiff submitted a proof of 
loss under its policy with Fidelity which was signed by 
plaintiff's president, Sam Herscovitz, and subscribed 
and sworn to before a notary public in Weber County, 
Utah, May 3, 1961 and which listed the amount claimed 
under the policy of insurance issued by Fidelity as 
$84,923.58 (R. 28; Plaintiff's Answer to Request for 
Admission of Facts No. 2). 
3 
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Under the terms of the insurance policy against 
which the proof of loss was submitted by plaintiff, 
Fidelity was allowed a period of 60 days after receipt 
of the proof of loss within which to investigate and de-
termine whether the payment should be made in the 
amount demanded in the proof of loss (R. 28; Plaintiff's 
Answer to Request for Admission of Facts No. 3). 
On June 19, 1961, payment in the exact amunt asked 
in its proof of loss was made to, and accepted by, plain-
tiff, by draft on Fidelity dated June 16, 1961, which 
draft was honored by Fidelity on June 23, 1961 (R. 28-
291 Plaintiff's Answer to Request for Admission of 
Facts No 4). 
To effect payment to plaintiff of the amount claimed 
in its proof of loss, as described in the preceding para-
graph, Fidelity authorized Jack Day and Edward Mabey, 
employees of the defendant Western General Agency, 
to issue and sign the draft of Fidelity in the amount 
of $84,923.58 and authorized Day to deliver the draft 
to plaintiff's president, Sam Herscovitz. 
Day went to Ogden to deliver the draft to plaintiff 
and, with a representative of defendant General Adjust-
ment Bureau, to negotiate a settlement with plaintiff 
of its claim against the American Home policy far 
business interruption loss. No proof of loss on that claim 
had yet been presented (R. 3). Plaintiff concedes it 
received full payment from Fidelity but contends it 
did so only after Day in furtherance of the alleged 
conspiracy, withheld delivery of the draft until plaintiff, 
under economic duress and coercion, agreed with Day 
and Bell to settle its claim against the business interrup-
4 
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tion policy of American Home for about one-fifth the 
amount actually due (R. 3, 4, 5). No other claimfor 
damages or for other relief was asserted against Fidelity 
in the complaint (R. 1-6). 
Plaintiff had filed his own sworn proof of loss 
for $48,386.00 and mailed it to American Home Insur-
ance Company. Thereafter Western General Agency, 
represented by Mr. Day, and General Adjustment Bu-
reau, represented by Mr. Ball went to plaintiff's place 
of business and discussed the business interruption loss. 
Briefly they wound up a four hour hasel when Mr. Day 
stated in final terms that he would deliver the Fidelity's 
$84,g.23.58 draft only on Plaintiff's acceptance of 
$12,609.39 payment by American Home for business 
interruption loss as computed by Mr. Ball soley. In 
desperation and with plaintiff's business about to coll-
apse, after 30 successful years, because it had no credit 
and no "\vay whatsoever to borrovv $84,923.58, Mr. 
Hersco\ritz acceded to this economic duress and pre-
ssure and signed the proof of loss. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. AS A lVIATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A TE,NDER OF 
$12,609.39 WAS NECESSARY BEFORE PROCEED-
liNG TO TRIAL. 
For many years, with some exception, the general 
rule has been that it is necessary to return the amount 
of value received under contract sought to be rescinded, 
or a release given for settlement of some chose in 
action, or at least an offer to do so. However, in the 
last 15 to 20 years or so it appears the trend is away 
5 
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fro1n this general rule and there are a great many 
states and a great many cases that have held by way 
of exception to the general rule that such return, or 
tender of return, of the values received need not be 
made as a condition precedent to an action for a bal-
ance due on the policy, 'vhen the amount received on 
the fraudlent settlement is smaller than the amount 
to which insured or beneficiary is entitledin any event 
under the policy, or where the settlement was void 
for want of a valid consideration. Occidental Life 
Incurance Company vs. Eiler - 125 Fed. 2nd, 229. "The 
amount promised on the face of an insurance policy 
must be deemed the liquidated amount of insurer's debt, 
when the contingency insured against by the policy's 
terms occrus, and the payment of a part of the amount 
unquestionably due on such liquidated debt is no "con-
sideration" for release of the balance of the debt. 
In the absence of a bona fide controversy existing 
between the beneficiary and the insurer, the payment 
by insurer of a part of its debt upon a dispute asserted 
by .it in bad faith and without any reasonable ground, 
.either in law or fact, constitutes no "consideration" 
for the release taken by insurer under such circumstan-
ces for less than it owes or settlement of the balance, 
and a release is void, and the beneficiary suing for the 
balance need not tender or pay into court the amount 
p~d by insurer, but recovery may be reduced by the 
amount of' such payment." 
The p-rinciple was applied to double indemnity 
insurance, when there was never a dispute as to the 
single indemnity, which was paid. It was said that by 
6 
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paying it the insured obtained nothing to which she was 
not entitled, and insurer paid nothing it could rightfully 
retain. So that there 'vas no consideration for releas-
ing double indemnity. That theory was also given 
effect in American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 26 Ala., 
App. 350 ( 3), 160 543 (certiorari denied 230 Ala, 221, 
160 So. 546); and see Richter v. Richter, 180 Ala. 218, 
60 So. 880; Crownover v. Crownover, 216 Ala. 286, 113 
So. 42 and also, 175 So. 554 - A1nerican Life Ins. Co. 
v. Williams; 17 N.E. 2 851 - Equitable Life Ins. Co. 
v. Taylor et al; 75 S.W. 2 77 4 - Kentucky Central Life 
and Accident Ins. Co. c Burrs; 187 S.W. 2-56 - Butler 
vi Missouri Inc. Co.; 108 S.W. 2 1052 - Schreiber et al 
v. Central Mutual Ins. Ass'n; 77 S.W., 2-149 - Yancey 
v. Central Mutual Ins. Ass'n; 77 S.W. 2 140 - Sappengton 
v. Central Mutual Ins. Ass'n. See also 112 A. L. R. 1215. 
But, notwithstanding the many that have made an 
exception to the general rule based on the "in any event 
rule" when at the pre-trial the trial judge asked counsel 
if they were in a position to tender the$12,609.39 to the 
defendant American Home, Counsel for the plaintiff 
informed the trial judge that they did not have that 
much money with them at that time but 0ould get it be-
fore the business day was out, and, would then and 
there make a tender of such payment. The trial judge 
made no further mention of this matter nor suggested 
that Plaintiff should or should not make such a tender. · 
POINT 2. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MONEY WAS 
NOT PROPERTY AND SO TO WITHHOLD PAY-
MENT OF $84,923.89·, AD~IITTEDLY DUE PLAIN-
TIFF, WAS NOT ECONOMIC DURESS AND 
•7 
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THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE. 
The pre-trial judge flatly ruled that money was not 
property. There was no question that the Fidelity 
draft in the amount of $84,923.58 and been made out 
and signed by 1\Ir. Mabey and 1\ir. Day, officers of the 
defendant \V estern General Agency, on authority of 
the company, and authorization given to deliver the 
said draft im1nediately to plaintiff. There was no 
authority given by it to defendant, Western General 
Agency, to withhold delivery unless a proof of loss for 
$12,609.39 was signed by plaintiff as full consideration 
of its business interruption loss. So that so far. as 
all parties were concerned, for all practical purposes, 
this draft was the property of the Plaintiff. 
A check is "property" within Laws 1923, p. 253, as 
to obtaining property by confidence game. Roll v. 
People, 243 P. 2d 641, 642, 78 Colo. 589. 
A cashier's check is "property," within the mean-
ing of the confidence game statute, when delivered and 
put into circ~ation. People v. Miller, 116 N. E .. 131, 
138, 278 Ill. 490, L. R. A. 1917 E, 7997. 
"Check is Property,"ownership and possession of 
which are safeguarded by general laws to same extent 
as other classes of property. Central Trust Co. v. 
Backsma.n, 198 N. E. 730, 50 Ohio App. 512. 
A check, draft, or order which is honored by a bank 
when the books of the bank show that the account of 
the depositor is thereby overdrawn, or any written 
record of such overdraft amounting to primary evidence 
thereof, is "property" within the meaning of the Em-
8 
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bezzlement Statute. State v. L.ottridge, 162 Pac. 673, 29 
Idaho, 822. 
Express cornpany checks, which had not been signed 
or countersigned by original payee, but in other respects. 
were complete, held "property" subject embezzlement, 
being evidence of debt, within West's Ann. Pen. Code, 
& 7, subde, 10, 12, and section 484, 503, 510, 514. People 
v. Cohen, 235 Pac. 658, 659, 71 Cal. App. 367. 
Six blank checks, with stubs attached, each of the 
value of one cent, the property of the United States, con-
stituted "property," the subject of larceny, under Rev. 
St. & 5456, 18 U. S. C. & 2112, making it a felony to 
steal any kind or description of p~roperty belonging to 
the United States, 168 F .. 697, 94 C. C. 368. 
"Property" is nomen generalissimum, and extends 
to every species of valuable right and interest. Mc-
Alister v. Pritchard, 230 S. W. 66, 67, 287 Mo. 491. 
Generally speaking, the word "property" includes 
all property of whatever description whether tangible 
or intangible. Bank of F·airfield v. Spokane County, 
22 P. 2d 646, 173 Wash. 145. 
In its proper sense property includes everything 
which goes to make up one's wealth or estate. Carlton 
v. Carlton, 72 Me. 115, 116, 39 Am. Rep. 307. 
Property signifies every species of property. It is 
nomen generalissimum, and comprehends all a man's 
worldly possessions. Rossetter v. Simmons, Pa. 6 Serg. 
& R. 452. 
The term "property" includes everything of value, 
9 
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tangible or intangible, capable of being the subject 
of individual right or ownership. First Nat. Bank of 
Estherville v. City Cou~cil of Estherville, 112 N. W. 
829, 832, 136 Iowa, 203. 
A bank deposit is "property" within statute auth-
orizing proceeding to discover money or other personal 
property or the proceeds or the value thereof belonging 
to decedent. In re Trevor's Estate, 123 N. Y. S. 2d 527, 
529. 
Moneys deposited in a bank in a general or ordinary 
account became the "property" of. the bank, and a part 
of its moneys, funds, and credits, within the meaning 
of Rev. St. 9-140, relating to embezzlement of bank's 
funds by bank official. State v. Wacker, 243 Pac. 1026, 
1028, 120 Kan. 387. 
The word "property" may be property used to sig-
nify any valuable right of interest protected by law. 
Franklin v. Franklin, 155 P. 2d 637, 641, 642, 67 Cal. 
App. 717. 
"Property" is a generic term, and includes money. 
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. March.) 75, 
90. 
The word "pToperty has been frequently held to 
embrace money and securities. Fry v. Shipley, 29 S. W. 
6, 8, 94 Tenn. ( 10 Pickle) 252. 
The word "property" embraces money. Fullerton 
v. Young, 94 N. Y. S. 511, 512, 46 Misc. 292, citing 
Laws 1892, p. 1486, c. 677, & 2-4. 
Money is "property" subject to levy by execution. 
10 
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Exchange Nat. Bank of Montgomery v. S!._ewart, 48 
So. 487, 489, 158 Ala. 218. 
POINT 3. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL 
0'0URT ERRED IN ACCELPTING CARTE BLANCHE 
DEFENDANTS COUNSEL'S STATE.}.fENT THAT 
THERE WAS NO E;VIDEN·CE OF ~CO NOMIC 
FRAUD OR DURESS EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFFS 
COUNSEL STATED THEY HAD SUCH EVIDENCE 
TO PRODUCE AT THE TRIAL. 
Defendants counsel made a flat statement that as 
far as he was concerned he saw no evidence of economic 
fraud or duress in the record and for that reason 
thought the court ought to make such a ruling and grant 
his motion for a judgment of dismissal on that 
basis alone. So far as plaintiff's counsel are concerned, 
the court gave the impression that he accepted such 
statement as fact and inclined his thinking along those 
lines. Certainly if every pre-trial statement of counsel. 
as to what could or could not be proven, and, if it were 
taken by the judge as a matter of fact, it would app·ear 
to us that no case would ever get past the pre-trial 
stage. Neither side is expected or obligated to produce 
witnesses at a pre-trial. Plaintiff's alleged economic 
duress and coersion in its complaint and it would have 
to produce evidence and witnesses to substantiate these 
allegations at the trial, so that it is reversible error for 
the pre-trial judge to accept a statement of counsel 
for either party as proven fact. The other party whom 
the judge rules against has had no opportunity to 
produce evidence to prove the allegations of his com-
plaint. This proposition is so basic and axiomatic 
11 
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that certainly no law can be found on the subject, 
Specifically the sole purpose of the pre-trial is to set 
and determine the issues and to learn in advance what 
each parey claims he can prove. This was not done in this 
case. 
POINT 4. THE TRIAL COURT E·RRED IN 
RULING THAT IF $84,923.89 IS AVAILABLE FOR 
LOAN PURPOSES ANYvv.HERE THERE COULD 
BE NO ECONOMIC DURESS ON PLAINTIFF, BE-
CAU·SE THE MERE FACT HE CANNOT GET THAT 
MONEY DUE, TO HIS CREDIT AND FINANCIAL 
CONDITION IS NO SOUND REASON FOR NOT 
OBTAINING THIS ~OAN. 
Plaintiff in this case together with his family have 
carried on a highly successful furniture business for 
over 30 years. However, in late years other furniture 
stores have started in Ogden and vicinity. 1Iany Ogden 
City residents have gotten in the habit of journeying 
to Salt Lake City to do business because of a wider 
selection of items. All these things have made the furni-
ture business highly competitive in Ogden, and have 
lowered very substantially the extent of credit that 
any one firm or individual can expect to receive on the 
purchase of merchandise. $84,923.89 is a very large 
sum of money for most any business and is certainly 
a staggering sum of money to expect the plaintiff to 
be able to borrow. In this fire, plaintiff lost substan-
tially all his merchandise and it "\vas impossible for him 
to borrow sufficient money to re-stock and be prepared 
to carry on business. Plaintiff had numerous orders 
for carpeting which were lost due to the impossibility 
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of getting new carpeting to replace the old. Plaintiff 
had no collateral or other means of negotiating for a 
loan for the large sum of money needed. No company 
in the country would send this amount of merchandise to 
the plaintiff without a very substantial payment in ad-
vance which plaintiff did not have. Even if plaintiff 
could have borrowed $85,000.00 the interest payments 
would be prohibitive. Plaintiff also had a number of 
well-trained employees, 'vho had been with him for a 
long time so that in order to assure their continued 
services lie kept them on the payroll. Every week that 
went by crippled the plaintiff substantially and greatly 
undercut chances of re-building and recouping. Had 
the plaintiff had any means whatsoever of obtaining 
credit or making a loan in the amount of $85,000.00 to 
immediately obtain merchandise to continue business 
he would have done so, and should have done so, hut 
this is not the fact in this case, as plaintiff can prove by 
facts, figures, and witnesses that this $84,923.99 was 
indispensible to the life of its continued operation. So 
we submit that it was reversible error for the pre-trial 
j·udge to rule that if $85,000.00 is available for loan 
purposes any where in the world that plaintiff had the 
obligation to get hold of this money and file suit, and, 
if he fails to do so, no matter what the reason there is no 
economic duress, we feel this proposition is so elemen-
tary that further argument would merely impose upon 
the court's good nature. 
POINT 5. THE QUESTION OF ALLE;GED 
CONSPIRACY AMONG THE DEFENDANTS OR 
THEIR AUTHORIZE:D AGENTS AS IT RELATES 
TO THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC DURESS WAS ONE 
13 
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OF FACT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMIT-
TIDD TO A JURY, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING THE MOTION OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS FOR A DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT 
AND ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Plaintiff had no funds with which to purchase new 
merchandise. Interest on a loan of that size was pro-
hibitive and Plaintiff's merchandise had been depleted 
by the Pacific Underwriters Salvage having taken the 
merchandise from plaintiff's place of business during 
the first week in April, 1961. The result being plaintiff 
was unable to offer merchandise to the general public 
and clearly points up the duress that the Court referred 
to in the case of Whitman Realty and Investment Co. 
v. Day, 161 Wash. 72, 296 Pac. 171, 173, wherein the 
Court said that duress exists whenever one is induced 
by another: 
"To make a contract under circumstances 'vhich 
deprive him of the exercise of his free will." In the 
ease of Riney v. Doll, 116 Kan. 26, 225 Pac. 1059, 1061, 
the Supreme Court of Kansas (while finding that no 
duress existed said: 
"When one uses the bludgeon of duress to break 
the will of his adversary and thereby gains a wrongful 
or unconscionable advantage, a Court will relieve the 
victiln of the consequences of the act he was thus 
forced to perform, whether his will be weak, requiring 
but one blow to shatter it, or whether it be of ordinary 
firmness, requiring several, or whether it be adamant. 
requiring many." 
14 
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"The Courts now quite generally recognize the 
inaccuracy of defining duress by applying it to a person 
of ordinary firmness." 
As stated in Colton v. Stanford, 82, Cal. 403, 23 
Pac. 16, 21, "The question whether there has been an 
undue advantage, an unconscionable exercise of super-
ior power, depends largely upon the situation of the 
parties at the time of the negotiations." 
The California court further stated in Blottman 
v. Gadd, 296 Pac., on page 687: 
"And intermixed among the elements going to con-
stitute a contract unconscionable are the elements of 
fairness, reasonableness, oppression and injustice, each 
and all dependent on the facts of each particular case." 
Another case in which the Court held that there was 
duress is set forth in House v. Carry, 112 V a. 362, 71 S. 
E. 551, 70 A. L. R. 711, 712, where a majority stock 
holder in control of a company threatened to conduct 
its business in such a way as to· render its stock value-
less, and refused to deliver any stock to the complainant, 
who was under financial stress, unless he would agree 
to accept a. smaller percentage of stock than he was 
entitled to under his contract, the Court in holding the 
agreement invalid as made under compulsion said on 
page 712 of 70 A. L. R. : 
"The doctrine appears to be well established that, 
where one party has possession or control of the prop-
erty of another, and refuses to surrender it to the control 
and use of the owner, except under compliance with an 
unlawful demand, a contract made by the owner under 
such circumstances, to emancipate the property is to be 
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regarded as made under compulsion and duress. Nor 
can it be doubted that a contract procured by the 
threats inducing fear of the destruction of one's prop-, 
erty may be avoided on grounds of duress, there being 
nothing in such a case but the form of a contract, wholly 
lacking the voluntary assent of the party to be bound 
by it. To constitute duress, it is sufficient if the will 
be constrained by unlawful presentation of a choice 
between comparative evils ; as, inconvenience and loss 
by the detention of property, loss of property alto-
gether, or compliance with an unconscionable demand. In 
civil cases, the rule as to duress has a broader appli-
cation at the present day that it formerly had. So 
'vhen concessions are exacted through the necessity of 
a person, in order to save his property, illegally wit~­
held by another, from destruction or irreparable injury, 
such a transaction may be voided on the ground of 
compulsion though not amounting to technical duress." 
In the case of Ingram v. Lewis, 37 A. ( 2d) 259, 70 
A. L. R. 710, the Supre1ne Court stated that the defend-
ant Lewis had all of plaintiff's cash that was in his 
E.state save and accept for $496.00 and that they, de-
fendant Trustees, could cut off plaintiff's ineo1ne in-
defina tely by refusing to turn over his proerty or_.--~ign 
a. division order. If the evidence adduced is true plain-
tiff had the choice of signing or starving. Such a release 
falls squarely within the two decisions of the Supreme 
Court decided in Lonegran v. Buford, set forth here-
inafter and Radich v. Hutching, 95 U. S. 210, 213. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had be-
for it the question of payments made under duress in 
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the case of Buford et al. v. Lonergen, et. al 22 Pac. 164, 
wherein judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and 
defendant appealed to the S.upreme Court of The United 
States in the case of Lonergan et. al. v. Buford, et. al. 
148 U. S. 581, 590, 13 S. Ct. 684, 37 L. ed. 569, cited in 
70 A. L. R. 710. 
"Delivery was refused by defendants until an 
illegal and unjust demand for property not delivered 
was paid. It was in the midst of winter when the prop-
erty required the personal care of the owner. Plaintiff's 
were compelled to either pay this demand or seek re-
dress by tedious and expensive litigation, the property 
remaining meantime in the possession of the parties 
hostile to plaintiff's interest, and liable to great de-
terioration and loss. Payment under such circumstan-
ces was not a voluntary payment, and being made under 
duress may be recovered back; and the fact that it 
was made with knowledge of all the facts makes no. 
difference." 
The Utah Supreme Court cited from Peyser v. 
Mayor, 70 N. Y. 497, wherein Judge Folger speaking 
for the Court said on page 167 of 22 Pac. 
"I have spoken of coercion in fact and coercion by 
law. By the first I mean that duress of person or goods 
where present liberty of person or immediate possession 
of goods is so needful and desirable as that an action 
or proceedings at law to recover them will not at all 
answer the pressing purpose." 
Also, Stenton v. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480: 
Wheelock Bros. v. Bankers Warehouse Company 
17 
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171 p. 2d 405, 1946. 
POIN'J~ 6. THE TRIAL COURT ER.R.ED IN FAIL-
ING TO SUBMIT TO A JURY THE ISSUE OF THE 
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF JACK R. DAY IN 
ACTING FOR D:IDFE:NDANT, AND IN GRANTING 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL FOR THE DEFEND-
ANTS. 
Plaintiff contends Jack R. Day was the general 
agent of Fidelity Insurance Company (now out of this 
action) and American Home Insurance Company, Fidel-
ity denied a General Agency, American Home never has. 
The deposition of Mr. Day strongly indicates a General 
Agency for both companies, and we have positive proof 
of it but we can only produce it by witnesses. The 
question of agency can only be resolved at a trial and 
not a pre-trial. 
The facts will show what transpired in the Reliable 
Furniture Company office on June 19, 1961, between 
the hours of 2 :00 p.m. and 6 :30 p.m. as the Presi-
dent of the plaintiff's Corporation great reluctance to 
accept the representations as made by general agent, 
Jack R. Day. 
As to defendant's contention that the Western Gen-
eral Agency by and through its Vice-President, Jack 
R. Day, acted outside the authority granted, it must be 
noted again that the Restatement of the Law on Agency, 
Second Volume, Section 229·, Page 506 set down certain 
elements that the Court may use in determining what 
authority a general agent has and what acts would 
make the principal liable for the general agent's acts 
and is set forth as follows: Section 229 KIND OF 
18 
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CONDUCT WITHIN SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT: 
Restatement of the Law on Agency sets out the 
principals' liability in Sections 261, 262, and 265, on 
Pages 570, 571, and 575. 
Section 261 AGENT'S POSITION ENABLES HIM 
TO DECEIVE. 
A principal who puts a servant or other agent in 
a position which enables the agent, while apparently 
acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon 
third persons is subject to liability to such third person 
for the fraud. Section 262. 
AGENT,ACTS FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES 
A person who otherwise would be liable to another 
for misrepresentations of one apparently acting for him 
is not relieved from liability by the fact that the servant 
or other agent acts entirely for his own purposes, un-
less the other has notice of this. 
Section 265 
CONDDU~CT WITHIN APPARENT AUTHORITY OR 
EMPLOYMENT GENERAL RULE 
A case in support of this position is set forth in 
Hartford Life Insurance C-ompany v. Sherman, 233 
Ill. 329, 78 N. E. 923 (1906). 
A principal or master is liable for exemplary dam-
ages for the wrongful, . wanton, and oppressive acts 
of his agents or servants when acting within the csope 
of his employment although the particular acts were 
not authorized or ratified, 134 Pac. 753. Forrester 
v. Southern Pac. Company. (Nevada 1913) 
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Other cases wherein the Courts have held that the 
principal was liable for representations made by its 
agent are hereinafter set forth: 
Ware v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, 311 P. 2d 316, 181 KAN. 291, 19·57 Case. 
Topinka v. American Eagle Fire Insurance Com-
pany, 167 Kan. 181, 185, 205 P. 2d 991, 993; Pages 319, 
320, of the Ware Case. 
Duarte et ux. v. Postal Union Life Insurance Com-
pany, 171 P. 2d 574, 584, 1946. 
Utilities Engineering Institute v. Criddle, 141 P. 
2d 981. 
Land Finance Corp. v.. Sherwin Electric Co., 102 
Vt.· 73, 146 A. 72; 75, A. L. R. 1025, 1030. 
Niartin v. Letham 71 P. 2d 336, 338. 
Otis Elevator Company v. The First Nat. Bank, 
163 California, 31, 39, 124, Pac. 704, 41 LRA. (N. S.) 
529. 
Keller v. Safe way Stores, Inc., et al. 108 P. 2d 605, 
610, 611. 
Grorud v. Lossl 48 Mont. 27 4, 136 Pac. 1069 
POINT 7. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S ~lOTION TO DISMISS 
IN THAT THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT PRE-
SENTED TRIABLE~ ISSUES, AND THEREFORE, 
CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF UTAH. 
At no time has the defendants taken issue with 
the complaint or amended complaint as failing to state 
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a cause of action -- they merely deny the allegations. 
All depositions and interrogatories are merely contrary 
to each other giving rise to triable issues which can only 
be resolved by producing witnesses and presenting 
documents for the consideration of a jury. A cursory 
examination of the file will bear this out. 
The pre-trial judge either ignored or overlooked 
the law of the State of Utah as laid down by this court 
a little over a year ago in the case of Baur v. Pacific 
Finance Corp. et al found at 383 P. 2d. 397. In that 
case the Court unanimously held and stated as follows: 
"As we have heretofore declared, the granting of a motion 
to dismiss, which deprives the party of the privileges 
of presenting his evidence, is a harsh measure which 
courts should grant only when it clearly appears that 
taking the view most favorable to the complaint and 
any facts which might properly be proved thereunder, 
unless it so clearly appears, doubt should be resolved 
in favor of allowing him the opportunity to present his 
proof." 
See also; Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P. 
2d 344. 
Issue was formed on many points of difference 
which can only be determined by testimony from both 
sides together with documentary proof. The pre-trial 
judge evidentally had formed a preconception of what 
stipulations had to be made without regard to the plain-
tiffs intended evidence and theory of the case, for the 
minute plaintiff's counsel stated that we could not 
answer "yes or no" to a stipulation the court had 
formulated but instead tried to explain why a "yes or 
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no" answer would alter the course of plaintiff's pro-
posed intended proof, the court summarily granted the 
motion to dismiss and refused to consider an explan-
ation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the granting of a motion to dismiss made 
by defendants at the pre-trial was er~o_neously granted 




PETE N. VLAHOS 
414 Eccles Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
